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Abstract: Morocco has a distinguished reputation for opening the economy, privatization and 
for increasing the role of the private sector in economic development.  The nation has also had 
well known success in achieving a high degree of price stability through a fixed and credible 
exchange rate that was supported by sound monetary policy.  All of these successes led to 
accelerated investment, both domestically and by foreigners. One highly important potential 
impediment to growth is that Morocco, however, appears to have neglected the global fiscal 
reform movement aimed at providing a growth oriented and fairer tax system that encourages 
private sector risk-taking and investment.  Following some key reform in the early 1990s, tax 
rates have not been altered much since then and remain relatively high, especially for individuals 
at low and moderate income levels, in comparison with other countries. This paper examines the 
importance of tax policy for investment and whether there are opportunities there to accelerate 
productivity and growth through tax reform.    
 Morocco has extremely high taxes, especially the individual income tax, social insurance 
or payroll taxes and the value added tax.  The individual income tax is the highest in the region 
and the highest marginal rate begins at a relatively low level of income.  The corporate tax rate is 
among the highest in the region as well.  At least one country in the region, Tunisia, has already 
taken the initiative to follow the global trend of cutting marginal tax rates in order to stimulate 
investment and growth.  Morocco could usefully consider taking the lead in pursuing more 
competitive and lower, broader and less-discriminating taxation.  Among the most critical steps 
would be cutting the top rate on individual income from 44 percent and extending the income 
level from where it begins to a larger multiple of median income. There are numerous loopholes 
that could be closed in order to finance such a change.  Such steps would have the added 
benefits of lowering interest rates and boosting private capital formation and economic growth.  
But a broader and more aggressive agenda of tax reform is easily justified by regional or 
international comparisons.     
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Is Tax Policy Retarding Growth in Morocco?  
 
Morocco has a distinguished reputation for opening the economy, privatization and for 
increasing the role of the private sector in economic development.  The nation has also 
had well known success in achieving a high degree of price stability through a fixed and 
credible exchange rate that supported, and was supported by, a sound monetary policy. 
Pressures from the International Monetary Fund and agreement that the Bank Al-Maghrib  
had achieved a reputation for sound anti-inflationary monetary policy led the country to 
begin to move toward a floating exchange rate, initially by broadening a peg to the U.S. 
dollar to a basket of currencies.  All of these successes led to accelerated investment, both 
domestically and by foreigners. Morocco agreed on August 31, 2007 to a Compact with 
the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation under which the country will receive $697.5 
million over five years for programs to stimulate growth and improve governance. 
Nonetheless, there seems to be a degree of puzzlement and anxiety over the slow growth 
of productivity and real income per capita which authorities regard as having had an 
insufficient response to the strong past actions.1   
  
One highly important potential impediment to growth is that Morocco appears to have 
neglected the global fiscal reform movement aimed at providing a growth oriented and 
fairer tax system that encourages private sector risk-taking and investment.  Following 
some key reform in the early 1990s, tax rates have not been altered much since then and 
remain relatively high, especially at low and moderate income levels, in comparison with 
other countries.  For example, Gwartney and Lawson (2006) show that Morocco cut the 
top marginal rate from 87 percent as recently as 1985, to 46 percent in 1995 and 44 
percent in 2000-2002. They report more aggressive and continuing cuts for a number of 
other countries, however.  More importantly, the top rates apply at relatively low incomes 
in Morocco. For example, Egypt cut the maximum rate from 80 percent to 34 percent 
over the same period, according to Gwartney and Lawson. While the size of the reduction 
is only slightly larger, the end result is a much lower marginal tax rate on individual 
income.  Thus the incentive to work, take risk, invest and grow income and employment 
is stifled for a large majority of the citizenry.  This paper examines the importance of tax 
policy for investment and whether there are opportunities there to accelerate productivity 
and growth through tax reform.    
 
 
I. Morocco’s Growth Problem 
Despite an excellent record for adopting trade, monetary, and privatization policies for 
promoting economic growth and openness, Morocco has not been very successful in 
boosting growth.  Table 1 shows the annual average growth rates of real GDP for non-
OECD Mediterranean countries and the largest emerging market economy on the African 
continent for five-year periods ending in 1985 to 2005.  The table shows that Morocco 
                                                 
1The International Monetary Fund (2007a) has concluded that Morocco’s growth accelerated to an 8.1 
percent rate in 2006, but probably fell back to a 2.5 percent rate in 2007, yet has “moved to a new 
trajectory.” This presumably reflects the notion that trend growth in economic capacity has accelerated 
somewhat.   
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has typically not been a growth leader.  Morocco was the growth leader for only one 
period, the five years ending in 1990, when growth averaged a 4.4 percent rate. In the 
five years ending in 2000, Morocco ranked third.  Despite acceleration in Moroccan 
growth in 2001-2005, Morocco slipped to fourth place. Four other Mediterranean 
countries (Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Tunisia) grew more rapidly over the full 25 year 
period.  Countries that grew more slowly generally had episodes of political instability 
that dominated their economic performance.   
  
Table 1 
Trend growth rates for selected Mediterranean countries  
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005* average 
Algeria 5.2 0.6 0.2 3.1 4.9 2.8 
Egypt 6.7 3.7 2.8 6.0 3.7 4.6 
Jordan 4.5 -0.5 6.2 3.2 6.2 3.9 
Lebanon 7.0 -17.1 12.2 2.3 4.0 1.7 
Libya -3.0 -4.6 1.3 2.1 4.9 0.1 
Morocco 3.3 4.4 0.9 3.6 4.2 3.3 
Syrian Arab 
Rep. 2.5 2.4 8.4 1.3 2.7 3.5 
Tunisia 3.8 3.0 3.9 5.6 4.5 4.1 
South Africa 1.4 1.7 0.9 2.8 3.9 2.1 
For 2005 based on IMF estimates for Lebanon, Morocco and 
Syria  
   
Chart 1 shows Morocco’s trend growth rate for five-year periods along with the year-
over-year growth rates.  The chart suggests some positive features that are not seen in 
Table 1.  First, the trend growth rate appears to be accelerating after 1995, but by 2006 
growth was still slower than it had been before 1990.  Moreover, Egypt and Jordan have 
higher average growth rates over the 25 years in Table 1 and have higher growth rate in 
the latest five-year period shown in the table.  While growth may be improving, it is not 
clear that Morocco will take the lead in the Mediterranean region soon.   
 
Second, the annual growth rate appears to have become less volatile.  Morocco has 
suffered serious recessions in the past because of drought and its impact on agricultural 
production, which is a large share of output. Whether droughts have become less frequent  
and/or less severe, or the economy has become less sensitive to them is unclear. At least 
for the former, the time span of reduced incidence is too short to generalize.2     
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2See Chafiki (2005) for a more detailed review of both of these trends.  The International Monetary Fund 
(2007a, b) recently endorsed the conclusions that growth is accelerating and that increasing diversification 
away from agriculture has reduced the volatility of the economy.  
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Chart 1 
Is Moroccan growth accelerating and becoming less volatile?  
Year-over-year and trend growth in Morocco
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Morocco’s growth problem is reinforced by its relatively low level of income. In 2005, 
Morocco had a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of $1,713, sixth out of the seven 
countries listed in Table 1.  Indeed, three of the countries in Table 1, Libya, Lebanon and 
South Africa, are upper-middle income countries according to the World Bank, meaning 
they have a gross national income (GNI) per capita above $3595, and less than $11,116.  
Table 2 shows GNI per capita and population for the countries shown in Table 1.  Real 
GDP per capita measures are similar and the rankings are the same for either measure.  
Of the nine countries, Morocco has the seventh highest GNI per capita, above only Syria 
and Egypt.  Its closest neighbors, Algeria and Tunisia have much higher incomes, 57 and 
66 percent, respectively, in 2005. In terms of population, Algeria is closest in size to 
Morocco and these two countries are the largest, after Egypt, in the Mediterranean region.   
 
Table 2 
Morocco is far behind most of the region in income per capita 
[Gross national income (GNI) per capita in U.S. dollars and population in 2005] 
 Algeria Egypt Jordan Lebanon Libya Morocco Syria Tunisia South 
Africa
GNI per 
capita 
$2730 $1260 $2460 $6320 $5530 $1740 $1380 $2880 $4770 
Population 32.9m 74m 5.5m 3.6m 5.9m 30.2m 19m 10m 46.9m 
Source: World Bank 
 
Perhaps more striking in a global context is that China had exactly the same GNI per 
capita as Morocco in 2005.  The implications of China’s rapid growth rate is telling both 
for where Morocco was relative to China 25 years earlier, and more importantly, where 
Morocco will be relative to China in 25 years if growth does not accelerate.   
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II. Gross capital formation  
One of the principal sources of economic growth is capital formation, including human 
capital, new plant and equipment and software and employment growth. We do not focus 
here on employment growth, but it is very sensitive to the taxation of labor income, as 
Gwartney and Lawson (2006) have indicated. Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2007) 
provide evidence that the large difference in hours worked by the adult population in 
Europe and the United States is due to differences in individual income and payroll tax 
rates.3 Rogerson’s argument is especially relevant for Morocco because he shows that the 
major effect of high tax rates on labor income, besides reduced employment and hours, is 
a stunted service sector as workers stay home and provide their own services, which 
would be relatively more expensive in the marketplace in a high-tax country.  
  
Growth in capital per worker is, along with technical change and innovation, the main 
source of growth in economic theory and in evidence on growth.  Human capital has 
come be regarded as an even more important form of capital formation for growth. 
Unfortunately, data on capital formation is difficult to obtain.  In particular, we do not 
have data on human capital in Mediterranean countries.   
 
In addition, the distinction between public and private capital formation is not widely 
made, even though private capital formation is directly motivated by concerns for 
efficiency and wealth maximization in ways that public capital formation is not. 
Nonetheless, gross capital formation data are used here because of availability.    
 
Table 3 
Gross capital formation as a percent of GDP  
(Five-year average data for period ending in year shown)    
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005* Average 
Algeria    33.3%    28.7%    26.5%    23.7%    23.5%    27.1% 
Egypt 31.4 30.5 18.1 19.9 17.2 23.4 
Jordan 31.8 21.5 29.3 24.2 20.9 25.6 
Libya 26.1 15.9 13.2 11.8 11.0 15.6 
Morocco 24.8 21.7 21.9 22.0 23.8 22.8 
Syria 23.9 17.5 24.9 20.1 21.8 21.6 
Tunisia 30.4 22.0 26.1 24.8 24.1 25.5 
S. Africa 25.6 19.3 15.7 16.1 15.8 18.5 
*Jordan data for 2001-04 
 
Table 3 shows gross capital formation as a percent of GDP for all of the Mediterranean 
countries except Lebanon. The IMF does not publish capital formation for Lebanon. 
Five-year averages are used, as in Table 1, to smooth the effects of the business cycle and 
the same periods are used, the periods ending in 1985 to 2005. In Jordan, 2005 data is not 
reported by the IMF so the 2001-04 average is used.   
                                                 
3 Also see Prescott (2002).  See also McCurdy, Green and Paasch (1990) and Knieser and Ziliak (1998) for 
discussions of the effect of taxation on labor supply and of major tax rate reforms on labor supply. 
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Morocco ranks second in capital formation in the latest period, just behind Tunisia, but 
typically it ranks lower.  In the 2000 period, Morocco ranked third behind Tunisia and 
Jordan.  Earlier the country ranked even lower; in the earliest period shown, it was sixth 
ahead of only Syria.  Unfortunately the relative improvement in the last ten years shown 
is due mainly to a decline in the intensity of capital formation elsewhere.  In general, the 
share of capital formation is lower in the other countries in the last two periods than their 
average for the full period. In Morocco, capital formation in the last ten years is about the 
same as its average for the full period.  For the full period, Morocco’s average share is 
lower than all the countries except Libya, Syria and South Africa.   
 
The data in Tables 1 and 3 can be used to show the importance of gross capital formation 
for economic growth.  There is a strong relationship between the share of capital 
formation in GDP and trend real GDP growth.  Chart 2 shows the share of capital 
formation for five-year periods along with the five-year annualized real GDP growth 
rates for each of the countries. 
 
Chart 2 
A higher share of capital formation in GDP raises trend economic growth 
Trend real GDP growth depends on the share of capital 
formation
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The trend line shows the positive relationship and the correlation coefficient for the two 
series is 0.27, which is the equivalent of a t-statistic of about 2.47. A simple linear 
regression of growth on the share of capital formation indicates that each one percentage 
point rise in the share of capital formation raises trend growth by 0.122 percent.  Thus a 
rise of one percentage point in trend growth requires an increase in the capital formation 
share of 8.2 percent.    
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Morocco data in Chart 2 are indicated by points shown as “triangles,” while others are 
“squares.”  The Morocco data are clustered near the middle of the chart for capital 
formation because there is little variation in the share of capital formation.  Except for the 
early 1990s, when real GDP growth was depressed by repeated droughts, and in the latest 
period when growth lays exactly on the trend line, Moroccan growth was generally above 
the trend line suggesting that growth was more favorable than capital formation alone 
might suggest. Morocco’s relatively low capital formation share results in its relatively 
poor growth performance. If growth is accelerating, as Chart 1 suggests, the rise in the 
capital formation share could be responsible.  China, the world’s leading emerging 
market with double digit growth recently, had a gross capital formation share of 43.5 
percent in 2005.  
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key indicator of openness and the attractiveness of 
the investment climate in a country and this is certainly the case in Morocco.4 In 2005, 
FDI was about $1.6 billion, or over 3 percent of GDP.  This compares favorably with FDI 
in China, which was 3.6 percent of GDP in the same year. According to the United 
Nations’ index of foreign direct investment performance for the eight Med countries, 
Morocco ranked second behind Lebanon in 2003, third in 2004 behind Lebanon and 
Jordan, and fifth in 2005.  Improving the equality of tax treatment of foreigners and 
domestic investors, liberalizing the capital account for capital outflows and lowering the 
taxation on domestic and foreign investors for income in Morocco would substantially 
improve the domestic investment climate, lower the cost of capital and boost the 
financing and quantity of investment. Alfaro, Chandra, Kalemi-Ozcan and Sayek (2006) 
argue that the mixed effects of FDI on productivity growth depend on the development of 
the financial sector.  They argue that financially constrained entrepreneurs are more 
likely to start new firms where there is more FDI financing.  Countries with a more 
developed financial sector grow twice as fast as those with weaker financial sectors, and 
countries with more developed financial sectors, or more human capital, have a more 
positive impact of FDI on productivity in their results.  The effect presumably works both 
ways, as countries with more FDI are more likely to develop stronger financial systems to 
manage international capital and trade payment flows.   
 
Improving openness of investment flows in both directions could also promote financial 
market integration in the region.  The potential for integration of the Moroccan economy 
and the Maghreb has been noted by Tahari and others (2007). They explain the 
importance of financial market integration for the Maghreb, the current obstacles to 
integration and provide some insightful steps that would move the countries toward 
closer integration.  They do not discuss the importance of tax reform for expanding the 
capital market and enhancing its efficiency, however, nor do they consider the potential 
for a financial center serving the broader MENA region. Increasing the attractiveness of 
the Moroccan economy for foreign investment and as a financial center for the region 
would provide substantial growth opportunities. 
                                                 
4Xu and Wang (2007) show that FDI has had a positive and significant effect on domestic investment in 
China since the 1990s, but they note that the evidence for other countries on such a positive effect is not 
uniform.    
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An expanded financial sector would boost the role of financial intermediation in 
Morocco.  Abbas and Christiansen (2007) provide causality evidence that growth in 
domestic debt boosts growth in 93 low-income and emerging markets for 1975-2004, but 
that beyond some threshold level this effect reverses.  Factors that boost the growth effect 
include the marketability of the debt, positive real interest rates and the extent to which it 
is held outside the banking system. Tahari et al. (2007) show that per capita GDP (in PPP 
terms) was boosted by higher shares of private credit in GDP and that this share lowered 
bank lending rates.  Lowering individual income taxes or even bank reserve requirements 
would lower borrowing costs and boost credit market activity, investment and growth, 
although they do not explicitly address these approaches.   
     
III. Tax Policy in Morocco and other Mediterranean countries 
Taxes are central to directing economic activity, in particular to impeding it.  Tax 
reformers, therefore, are prone to emphasize the importance of cutting tax rates and 
making up for revenue losses by broadening tax bases, especially by removing tax 
breaks, exemptions or credits that lead to inefficiencies or losses in the availability of 
resources.  Thus, tax policy has a critical role to play in promoting economic 
development. In an emerging market context, this is especially important because most of 
the effort is to increase incentives to work, save and invest in a country. Often, there is 
almost a single-minded emphasis on attracting foreign business, entrepreneurs and 
capital.  This is ironic because domestic residents are best able to know and respond to 
economic incentives and to assess new opportunities for return and risk.  One of the best 
recent examples of the response of capital formation and economic growth to new tax 
incentives is the reallocation and growth of global capital due to U.S. tax cuts in the early 
1980s and the subsequent reversal of those incentives n 1986.5  The recent experience in 
the United States in response to individual tax changes is another example.  Investors do 
respond to changes in the taxation of capital income, both at the individual tax level and 
at the corporate income level.  The prospects for enhanced growth through tax reform are 
a largely unexplored policy, especially in the Mediterranean countries.   
 
Taxes are only one of many barriers to investment in productive activities and growth. 
Before focusing on taxes, some perspective on other barriers can be found in the World 
Bank’s project on the ease of doing business in various countries.  The World Bank 
breaks this issue down into ten criteria: starting a business, dealing with licenses, 
employing workers, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying 
taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a business.  The 2008 
overall ranking, based on 2007 data, is given in the first column of Table 4.  Libya has 
not been covered yet in this project. Morocco ranks 129 out of 178 countries lower than 
all of the Med countries except Syria and lower than South Africa (35).  Morocco’s 
overall rank was 115 out of 175 in 2007. Both Egypt and Algeria moved up from lower 
than Morocco in the 2007 ranking to higher in the 2008 ranking.   Table 4 also shows 
rankings for four of the key factors that affect capital formation and that are components 
of the ten factors making up the overall ranking.  
                                                 
5 See Tatom (1989) and (1995) for an elaboration of the theory and for evidence on how tax changes affect 
incentives to invest both within a country and in the rest of the world.    
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Table 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall ease of doing business rank and selected components 
 
 
 Ease of 
doing 
business  
Getting 
credit 
Protecting 
investors 
Paying 
taxes 
Enforcing 
contracts 
Algeria 125   115* 64 157 117 
Egypt 126   115*    83* 150 145 
Jordan   80   84 107   19 128 
Lebanon   85   48     83*   33 121 
Morocco 129 135 158 132 114 
Syria 137 158 107   98 171 
Tunisia   88   97 147 148   80 
South Africa   35   26     9   61   85 
*tie 
 
On taxes, the World Bank index considers the tax rate on profits, the number of tax 
payments, and the time required to pay taxes, as well as labor taxes and contributions, 
other taxes and total tax payments as  a percent of profits, in assessing the overall index 
for paying taxes.  Overall, Morocco ranks in the middle of their regional partners, ahead 
of Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, but behind Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria and South Africa.  
Morocco scores best, third, on labor and other taxes, and worst, last, on the profit tax rate 
(not shown). On the total tax paid indicator, Morocco ranks fifth of the seven countries.   
It is very high in several countries because it includes all the taxes paid by business, not 
simply the corporate tax rate.  It is higher in Algeria (72.6%) and Tunisia (61%) than in 
Morocco (53.1%), but it is much lower in the other Med countries. Because of a recent 
cut in Tunisia’s corporate tax rate (see footnote 6 below), Morocco may drop below even 
Tunisia in future World Bank reports, despite recent tax reform moves in Morocco.          
 
Morocco’s corporate tax rate is not 53.1 percent; the top corporate rate in 2007 is 35 
percent, but there are many other taxes that businesses pay that make the average tax 
share of corporate income much higher.  The difference reflects the numerous other taxes 
that make business taxation so onerous and time consuming.  For example, there are 
registration fees for land purchases (5%, lower for building plots purchased by 
individuals), and on corporate capital and capital increases (0.5%), notary taxes on 
incorporation or property exchanges, a separate urban tax, municipal taxes on rental value 
of premises (10%), license taxes, VAT taxes, and payroll taxes.   Part of the difficulty of 
assessing the effect of taxation on the incentive to invest, especially in emerging 
economies is the multiplicity of taxes, the time spent computing and paying them and the 
exceptions to them.  Many of these taxes are merely nuisance taxes that encourage 
corruption by permitting multiple exceptions and discretion on the part of tax assessors 
and collectors.  
 
Table 5 shows the ten components that make up the World Bank ease of doing business 
index, as well as Morocco’s rank in 2008 among the seven Med countries. Morocco 
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scores relatively highly compared to the region in the ease of starting a business, 
enforcing contracts, and ease of closing a business. The country scores worst and last on 
the ease of employing people (includes the cost of hiring and difficulty of hiring and 
firing and the rigidity of hours), protecting investors and the ease of trading across 
borders. The ease of getting credit is sixth among seven countries.  
   
               Table 5 
Ten Components of the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index (Morocco Rank) 
Component Regional rank 
Ease of starting a business 1 
Ease of dealing with licenses 3 
Ease of employing workers 7 
Ease of registering property 5 
Ease of getting credit 6 
Protecting investors  7 
Ease of paying taxes 4 
Ease of trading across borders 7 
Ease of enforcing contracts 2 
Ease of closing a business 3 
 
 
Table 6 provides the maximum marginal corporate and individual tax rates for the 
Mediterranean countries, according to the Heritage Foundation-Wall Street Journal 
project on the Index of Economic Freedom, Kane, Holmes and O’Grady (2007).  The 
marginal tax rate is the tax rate applied to an additional unit of income.  The three 
measures in the table are the key ingredients in achieving the fiscal score, one of 10 
scores that make up the overall index of economic freedom.  In the overall ranking, given 
in parentheses, Jordan (53), Tunisia (69) and Lebanon (77) are at the top of the region, 
although South Africa (52) edges out Tunisia when the African continent is considered.  
These four countries are in the “moderately free” range, above the rest, which, with the 
exception of Libya, are in the “mostly unfree” range.  Libya is in the bottom range of 
“repressed” countries. Morocco (96) ranks well above the bottom four countries, which 
are, in descending order, Egypt (127), Algeria (134), Syria (142) and Libya (155).  
 
The fiscal scores of all of these countries are above their overall scores, suggesting that 
fiscal systems are relatively favorable to economic freedom. Morocco has the lowest 
fiscal score of all the countries shown, reflecting the relatively high marginal tax rates 
and tax burden.     
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Table 6 
Maximum tax rates in Mediterranean and African countries 
 Income tax rate Corporate income 
tax 
Total tax revenue 
(percent of GDP) 
Algeria    40%    30%    10.8% 
Egypt 20 20 12.8 
Jordan 25 25 20.8 
Lebanon 10 15 16.9 
Libya 15 40 2.4 
Morocco 44 35 22.7 
Syria 20 35 11.6 
Tunisia 35 35 20.7 
South Africa 40 29 24.3 
Source: Kane, Holmes and O’Grady (2007) 
 
Morocco has the second highest marginal tax rate on corporate income, behind Libya, but 
tied with Syria and Tunisia.6  In fall 2007, after this paper was first presented, the 
Moroccan government announced a cut in the corporate tax rate to 30 percent, matching 
Tunisia’s 2007 cut, but still higher than all the other Med countries except Libya and  
Syria.  More importantly, Morocco has the highest individual income tax among the 
countries, at 44 percent. This tax rate kicks in at a mere Moroccan dirham 60,000, the 
equivalent of a little over US$7000, a figure that is below the poverty level in the United 
States for even a single person (US$10,210). This indicator may be as important as the 
level of the tax rate itself in retarding economic activity and growth. The overall tax 
burden as measured by the percent of GDP taken by taxes is also the highest in the 
region, but South Africa has a slightly higher level.  South Africa is certainly not a model 
for the Mediterranean region as it has a relatively high maximum marginal tax rate for 
individuals, tied with Algeria at 40 percent, but higher than all other countries besides 
Morocco.  Even the corporate tax rate at 29 percent exceeds that in three of the more 
prosperous Mediterranean countries.  Its overall fiscal score is lower than any other 
country in the region except for Morocco.    
 
Even China is a poor role model in the tax policy area. According to Kane, Holmes and 
O’Grady, the individual tax rate in China is 45 percent, the top corporate rate is 33 
percent and the overall tax take is 15.1 percent of GDP. These tax rates are comparable to 
Morocco’s, but the tax take is lower.  Of course in China, a greater proportion of 
enterprises are state-owned, which distorts the tax measure as an indicator of private 
enterprise. In a recent move to unify taxation of foreign and domestic firms, China has 
lowered the corporate tax rate to 25 percent; see Mitchell (June 2007b).  
 
There are a couple of other taxes that are quantitatively important and can affect 
investment and growth.  The first is the payroll tax.  These taxes on labor employment 
discourage employment.  They are generally tied to social welfare programs such as 
                                                 
6 Tunisia recently dropped its top rate for the corporate income tax to 30 percent, according to the IMF’s 
recent Article IV staff report on Tunisia (2007c).    
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retirement income provision or disability income. Table 7 shows estimates of payroll tax 
rates and value-added or general sales tax rates for the countries in 2007, according to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and the World Bank.   
 
 Table 7 
Morocco has relatively high sales and payroll tax rates 
 Value added or general 
sales tax rate 
Payroll tax rate 
Algeria 17% 26% 
Egypt 10 24-26 
Jordan 16 11 
Lebanon 10 21.5 
Morocco 20 17.7 
Syria NA 14/3 
Tunisia 18 16 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers and World Bank 
 
Morocco has the highest value added (VAT) or general sales tax in the region, in fact, it 
is among the highest in the world. The highest rate in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) is 25 percent in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.  
Iceland has a 24.5 percent rate and Finland and Poland have a 22 percent rate.  Belgium, 
Ireland and Portugal (in the Azores and Madeira the maximum VAT tax is 15%) have a 
21 percent rate. These nine countries probably have the highest rates in the world and the 
only ones higher than in Morocco.7         
 
Morocco’s high tax rates and poor placement among its regional peers have not been the 
result of tax increases. The high level of tax rates in Table 6 is the result of complacency 
in the face of a regional and global tax reform. The Wall Street Journal-Heritage 
Foundation project on economic freedom began in 1995. At that time, Morocco was 
second in the region to Tunisia and their tax score was 73.7, while Tunisia’s was 75.7. 8 
South Africa’s was also slightly better than Morocco’s at 75.7.  The overall average for 
the eight Med countries was 64.2.  Other countries significantly improved their tax 
systems, but Morocco’s score changed little so that in 2007 it was 75.5. Meanwhile the 
average for the eight countries rose to 86.7, well above Morocco’s score.  Tunisia’s score 
rose to 80.8, but it too was far below the scores in Lebanon (95.9), Egypt (93.6), Jordan 
(88.8), Syria (88.3), Libya (87.8) or Algeria (82.6).  Complacency in tax reform in both 
Morocco and Tunisia allowed other Med countries to surpass them in the competition to 
lower tax rates and attract entrepreneurial activity and investment. South Africa, a leader 
in tax policy in 1995, showed more improvement, but was behind all eight Med countries 
except Morocco.  
 
                                                 
7 Tunisia had a VAT tax of 29 percent until recently; see IMF (2007c).  
8 The fiscal score is based on the average of three scores based, in turn, on the marginal tax rates and tax 
share shown in Table 5. Each index is 100 minus the square of the relevant tax measure.  See Wall Street 
Journal-Heritage Foundation (2007).    
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The high taxes in the Morocco also stand out most in comparison to global trends. 
Fundamental tax reform has been very rapid in Europe and in the rest of the world, 
leaving the United States in the dust as it considers booting taxes with the end of the 
Bush tax rate cuts. According to the Wall Street Journal (July 13, 2007), there is a global 
trend toward cutting corporate and individual tax rates. They mention proposed cuts in 
corporate tax rates in Vietnam, Singapore, Northern Ireland, Germany and France, all of 
whom have lower corporate tax rates than the United States or Morocco. Mitchell (June 
2007b) mentions policy discussions to cut the corporate rate in these countries and in 
New Zealand, Australia, Canada and Russia. The race to cut tax rates, which began in the 
United States in 1981, is continuing apace in the rest of the world.  Sweden and Norway 
have cut their rate to 28 percent from 60 and 50 percent, respectively, according to 
Mitchell.  The average in the European Union is now 26 percent and headed down, while 
for the average for Europe is even lower.  Mitchell (July 2007a) shows that the average 
rate for Europe is 24.2 percent in 2007, down from 38 percent as recently as 1996.   
 
Hubbard (2007) explains that the corporate income tax is inefficient.  He also cites the 
evidence in Hassett and Mathur (2006) that a one percent rise in the corporate income tax 
rate reduces the manufacturing wage rate by 0.8 percent.  By raising the cost of capital 
for firms, a higher corporate tax rate reduces the incentive to invest, reducing investment 
and the quantity and quality of capital resources that workers have available and lowering 
productivity and therefore wages. The wage reduction applies to all workers, not just the 
manufacturing workers studied by Hassett and Mathur.  Even more troubling is that the 
corporate tax taxes the income from capital over and above the taxation of this income at 
the individual level.  Many countries are addressing this by lowering the taxation of 
dividends and capital gains, but double taxation remains the rule.9  Modern tax analysis 
shows that capital resources are the most elastic in supply in the long run so that taxing 
capital at all is extremely inefficient and lowers the available capital stock, an essential 
ingredient in productivity and growth, the most of any tax.  The taxation of capital 
income raises the cost of capital for business and thereby cuts investment and growth.  A 
recent study by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2007) shows that each one percent rise in the 
cost of capital for business reduces investment by 50 to 75 basis points and, in the long 
run, reduces the stock of capital by 1 percent. 
 
As Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2007) have emphasized, high marginal tax rates on 
individual income reduce labor effort.  In Morocco, labor force participation is only about 
45 percent of the adult population and about 10 percent of those seeking work are 
unemployed.  This means that only about 40 percent of the adult population works, not 
surprising given the level of the marginal tax rate.  One of the easiest ways to boost 
employment would be to lower the marginal tax rate on individual income; increasing 
employment has a much larger impact on output than an equal percentage point rise in 
the nation’s capital stock.   
 
                                                 
9 Owens (2005) demonstrates the global trend in reducing tax rates and broadening the tax base by 
simplification of taxes and eliminating exemptions and other selective and discriminatory tax breaks.  See 
also Mitchell (2007a, b).  
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In the World Bank Doing Business project, in consultation with PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2007), researchers find that the greater the ease of paying taxes, the better are the 
educational and other infrastructure systems, the smaller the informal sector and the 
greater is investment as a share of GDP.  Moreover, they find that among poorer 
countries, there is a Laffer curve, along the backside of which raising tax rates actually 
lowers revenue as a share of GDP.10  The study offers the example of Russia where the 
corporate tax rate was reduced from 35 percent in 2001, the same rate as today in 
Morocco and in the United States, to 24 percent. Corporate tax receipts subsequently rose 
by an average annual rate of 14 percent per year for the first three years.   
 
Some 19 countries now have a flat rate tax system characterized by a relatively low 
maximum marginal tax rate. Wikipedia lists 19 countries with a flat tax.  The flat tax rate 
in these countries is also relatively low, a hallmark of a flat tax.  Russia is perhaps the 
largest economy with a flat tax, and the rate there is 13 percent. Among the leaders in 
Eastern Europe in moving to a flat tax are the Baltic states of Estonia (22%), Latvia 
(27%) and Lithuania (27%).11 
 
Gwartney and Lawson (2006) estimate that a 10 percent cut in the top marginal tax rate 
will boost long-term growth by 0.3 percentage points. This is not a massive increase, but 
it makes a huge difference over time in the level of per capita income.  Barro (1996) 
found the same effect from cutting another more implicit tax, inflation.  He finds that a 10 
percentage point cut in the tax rate will boost the long-term economic growth rate by 0.3 
percent.  Since inflation is already low in Morocco, gains from reducing inflation have 
been nearly exhausted.  By the former estimate, however, another half point boost in 
growth could be achieved by cutting the maximum marginal tax rate for individuals by 
about 15 percentage points, or to about 30 percent.   
 
Some steps in tax reform may be simpler than others. The large numbers of exceptions, 
exemptions and credits, or in many cases, differential tax rates for different activities, 
could be eliminated, providing a revenue bonanza that could be offset by overall tax rate 
reduction.  A second prospect is to explore for “Laffer-Curve” possibilities where rate 
reduction could actually boost revenue, offering further opportunities for tax rate 
reduction.  Such opportunities are usually found in selective taxes on particular goods or 
classes of goods or on particular sources of income that are taxed separately or 
differentially.  Other opportunities for boosting economic growth through tax rate 
reduction may require short-term trade-offs of higher deficits temporarily.  This is more 
difficult in Morocco, where there is a long history of chronic and sizeable budget deficits.   
 
A final consideration that is important is the mix of tax rate reductions.  Development 
specialists and investment banks are prone to focus on corporate tax rate cuts as offering 
the most visible incentives to attract new business ventures from domestic and foreign 
investors. There is strong merit in this view, but investors and workers also respond to 
                                                 
10 See the Wall Street Journal ( July 13, 2007)  for a graph showing the corporate Laffer curve, which peaks 
in Norway at corporate tax rate of  28 percent, but the curve for poorer countries likely peaks at a much 
lower rate.   
11See Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flat_tax#Countries_that_have_flat_tax_systems).   
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individual tax rates, and these are far higher than in other nations in the region and much 
of the rest of the world.  Moreover, there is a difference in the effects of tax rates on the 
general level of interest rates.  Higher corporate tax rates tend to raise the cost of capital 
to firms and reduce investment. This, in turn, reduces firms’ demands for funds in equity 
and credit markets, with the latter having the effect of reducing market interest rates. 
Conversely, lowering corporate tax rates tends to raise interest rates. Individual tax rates 
on income from capital have the opposite effect on interest rates.  Individuals’ decisions 
to save and invest depend on the after-tax rate of return they can earn, and a cut in the 
individual tax rate will boost supplies of funds to equity and credit markets.  In credit 
markets, such a boost in supply will lower the interest rates. Thus the cost of capital is 
lowered and investment stimulated regardless of whether the individual or the corporate 
tax rate is lowered.  But the effect on individual decisions to purchase houses or 
consumer durables or for small firms that face lower tax rates, or non-profit ventures, to 
expand their investment and economic activities is greater with a cut in the individual 
income tax rate.12 Such a low interest rate strategy could also be more favorable to the 
development of the domestic financial system, especially if coupled with a competition 
enhancing opening of capital markets to foreign investment opportunities.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
Morocco has a well-deserved reputation as a country that is modernizing and expanding 
its private sector to boost economic growth.  While there is some concern that these 
efforts are not being adequately reflected in productivity growth and overall 
development, it does appear that the growth trend is accelerating, even if it is slower than 
might be desired.  Capital formation is not unusually low, but it is not especially rapid 
either.  Faster economic growth and development could be achieved by policies that 
penalize investment less heavily.   
 
Morocco has extremely high taxes that fall on relatively low income classes, especially 
the individual income tax, social insurance or payroll taxes and the value added tax.  The 
individual income tax is the highest in the region and the highest marginal rate begins at a 
relatively low level of income.  The corporate tax rate is among the highest in the region 
as well.  At least one country in the region, Tunisia, has already taken the initiative to 
follow the global trend of cutting marginal tax rates in order to stimulate investment and 
growth.  Morocco could usefully consider attempting to compete by taking the lead in 
pursuing more competitive and lower, broader and less-discriminating taxation.  Among 
the most critical steps would be cutting the top rate on individual income from 44 percent 
and extending the income level where it phases in to a larger multiple of median income. 
There are numerous loopholes that could be closed in order to finance such a change.  
Such a step would have the added incentive of lowering interest rates and boosting 
private capital formation and economic growth.  But a broader and more aggressive 
agenda of tax reform is easily justified by regional or international comparisons.     
 
                                                 
12 See Mundell (1971) or, for a specific application, Tatom (1989) and (1995).  
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